The Making of Policy: Institutionalized or Not? by Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi




Department of Research and Chief Economist
IDB-WP-108 IDB WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 
Inter-American Development Bank









Documents published in the IDB working paper series are of the highest academic and editorial quality. 
All have been peer reviewed by recognized experts in their field and professionally edited.  The 
information and opinions presented in these publications are entirely those of the author(s), and no 
endorsement by the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the countries 
they represent is expressed or implied. 
  
This paper may be freely reproduced provided credit is given to the Inter-American Development Bank. 
 
2009
Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the 
Inter-American Development Bank 
Felipe Herrera Library 
 
Scartascini, Carlos G., 1971- 
 
The making of policy : institutionalized or not? / Carlos Scartascini, Mariano Tommasi. 
p. cm. (IDB Working Paper Series ; 108) 
Includes bibliographical references. 
1. Latin America—Politics and government. 2. Politics, Practical—Latin America. 3. Policy sciences. I. 
Tommasi, Mariano, 1964-. II. Inter-American Development Bank. III. Title. IV. Series. 
 
JL966 .S33 2009 





This  paper develops a framework for analyzing  different policymaking 
styles, their causes and their consequences in Latin America, finding that 
lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies 
(APTs) are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies, the 
higher the potential damage they can cause, the lower the wealth of the 
economy, and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure  political 
power.  Moreover, strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative 
political technologies; for instance “bribes by the rich” and “protests by the 
poor” are likely to be countervailing forces, and will both occur in polities 
with weaker political institutions. 
 
Keywords: Political institutions, Public policies, Institutional strength, 
Protests, Alternative Political Technologies, Development, Judicial 
independence, Party institutionalization, Congress capabilities, Cabinet 
stability, Corruption 
 
JEL Classification: D72, D74, D78, H89, K42 
 
 
                                                            
* We received valuable comments and suggestions from Jon Eguia, David Epstein, Macartan Humphreys, 
Graciela Kaminsky, Humberto Llavador, Cesar Martinelli, Massimo Morelli, Vicky Murillo, Pablo Pinto, 
Adam Przeworski, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Frances Rosenbluth, Ken Scheve, Ernesto Stein, David Stasavage, 
Susan Stokes, Razvan Vlaicu, Federico Weinschelbaum, and seminar participants at Columbia, George 
Washington,  the Inter-American Development Bank, New  York  University, Universidad de San Andrés, 
Yale, the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association Meeting in Rio de Janeiro, the Latin 
American and Caribbean Economic Association Political Economy Group Meeting in Cartagena, and the Yale 
Conference on Fighting and Voting.  We are indebted to Fabiana Machado for allowing us to draw freely 
from our joint ongoing empirical work on protests in Latin America, as well as for valuable suggestions and 
insights.  We are particularly indebted to Laura Trucco for extraordinary research assistance.   6   
1.  Introduction 
 
Formal analysis of policymaking within the realm of political institutions has deepened our 
understanding of how political institutions shape economic policies.  There is by now a rich 
and growing literature on the impact of various legislative and electoral institutions on a 
number of relevant policy outcomes, such as the size of general public goods, targeted 
transfers, local public goods, and rent extraction by politicians. Persson and Tabellini 
(2000) is presently the standard textbook treatment of this literature.
1
In almost all of this literature, most or all of the relevant action takes place within 
the context of these formal institutional rules and relatively formalized institutional arenas 
(the voting booth, the building of Congress, etc.).  That is certainly a very good 
approximation for policymaking in various countries at some moments in time (mostly 
developed countries in the last several decades), but it is a much rougher approximation of 
present-day policymaking in other countries or even in most countries at other points in 
history. 
 
Other than voting, forming political parties, bargaining in the legislature, and the 
like, there are a number of alternative political technologies (such as threats of violence 
and of disruption of economic activity) that individuals or groups could utilize in order to 
influence collective decisions. As  Persson and Tabellini themselves state  (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2000: 10) in the introduction to their textbook: “Citizens interact with politicians 
in two ways: through voting at the elections, and through lobbying by organized interest 
groups. We neglect other forms of political participation, such as protests. Protests are 
certainly important in the real world, and we wish we had more to say about them. But they 
have rarely been studied formally by economists, or political scientists (an exception is the 
interesting work by Lohmann (1994, 1998)).” In this paper we take a step towards 
incorporating alternative political technologies (such as protesting) into  models of 
institutions and policies. 
                                                            
1  A  number of important contributions have been produced since that book was published.  Another 
contemporaneous textbook treatment of the field of Political Economy in economics is provided by Drazen 
(2000), which is more explicit in the treatment of various substantive areas of (macro)economic policy, and 
less explicit in institutional comparative statics of the type emphasized in Persson and Tabellini (2000). 
Dewan and Shepsle (2008a, 2008b) and Besley (2004) provide interesting, albeit idiosyncratic, updated 
surveys. Alesina, Persson and Tabellini (2006) is a highly readable recent statement by some of the founding 
fathers of the field.   7   
This paper is an exploration on the implications of an enlarged political action space 
for the study of institutions and policymaking.
2
One implication of our analysis is the fact that different countries will have different 
degrees of institutionalization in the way in which collective decisions are made. This is 
consistent with many observations on, for instance, contemporary policymaking in Latin 
America (e.g.,  Stein et al, 2008).
  We investigate the way in which the 
presence of these alternative political technologies  (APTs), in interaction with formal 
political institutions and underlying socioeconomic structures, influences the workings of 
institutions, policy outcomes, and the use of such technologies in equilibrium. 
3
As emphasized in the more abstract literature on institutions, institutions are 
equilibrium phenomena.  As such, they reflect past investments, they summarize 
information, beliefs and expectations, and they incorporate self-reinforcement effects.
  Such comparisons reveal important variation across 
countries and over time in the degree to which formal institutions such as Congress and 
political parties are the central locus of programmatic demands by socioeconomic actors, 
and (conversely) the degree to which socioeconomic interests use, instead, alternative 
political technologies to influence policymaking. 
4
                                                            
2 We are not the first authors to consider the impact of alternative political technologies on some aspects of 
the workings of formal political institutions.  Notable recent contributions in that spirit include Ellman and 
Wachtekon (2000) who study electoral competition under the threat of political unrest, and Dal Bó and Di 
Tella (2003) and Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di Tella (2006) who study political agency in models in which interest 
groups can cause politicians harm.  This is also related to earlier insights in Grossman (1991), Hirshleifer 
(1995, 2001), Skaperdas (2006) and references there. (See also Humphreys, 2001). Some of the intuitions of 
this paper are reminiscent of results in the international relations literature, for instance “bargaining in the 
shadow of power” (Powell, 1999). Przeworski (2008) is a very insightful effort motivated by the same facts as 
this paper (road blockades by farmers in Argentina).  We are indebted to Adam Przeworski for generously 
sharing his ideas on these issues. 
  It is 
therefore quite natural to use that general logic to think about the determinants of the 
relevance of specific institutional arenas for policymaking.  When Congress and the 
political party system are the effective conduits of preference aggregation and political 
bargaining, various relevant actors will place their bets (that is, their investments) in those 
3 Our applied focus on countries with an intermediate level of both economic and institutional development is 
also a motivation for attempting to develop models that combine the analysis of behavior within the rules of 
formal institutions with behavior outside those channels. Studies of policymaking in developed countries tend 
to place great emphasis on formal political institutions and arenas, while studies in the political economy of 
development, until recently, paid scant attention to those details (compare textbook treatments of US politics 
such as Schmidt, Shelley and Baredes, 1991, with textbook treatments of African politics such as Chazan et 
al, 1999).  Geddes (2002) provides an insightful overview of the recent move in the political economy of 
development toward incorporating the study of the details of operation of democratic institutions. See also 
Bates (1990).  
4 See for instance Aoki (2001), Pierson (2004), Greif and Laitin (2004), and Greif (2006).   8   
institutions, most citizens will believe that those are the spaces where relevant decisions are 
made, and this whole logic would reinforce and become self-fulfilling. On the contrary, if 
such institutional arenas are not taken too seriously, and everybody knows that the way of 
getting something out of the political system is to blockade a road or to bribe the president, 
those investments in the institutionalization of Congress or parties will not be undertaken, 
and the lack of institutionalization will be reinforced.
5
A related implication of our analysis, which fits naturally with the logic of 
institutions above, is that there is multiplicity of equilibria.  Polities might be stuck with 
higher or lower levels of institutionalization.  While polities in more institutionalized 
equilibria will behave as predicted in the “tidy” literature on political institutions and 
policies, polities in less institutionalized equilibria might behave differently. This could 
have important implications for cross-national empirical analysis on the effects of formal 
political rules on public policy. 
 
Section 2 introduces the general logic of studying institutions and policymaking in 
the presence of alternative political technologies.  Section 3 develops a specific model 
within that general logic, featuring a formal legislative bargaining arena and a specific 
alternative technology (“road blockades”).  Section 4 describes the general implications of 
the model and presents various comparative statics results.  One of the most interesting 
(albeit not surprising) results is that, ceteris paribus, the more uneven the distribution of 
political power within formal institutions, the more likely we are to observe extensive use 
of alternative political technologies and low degrees of institutionalization.  Section 5 
presents three levels of empirical evidence (preliminarily consistent with the logic of the 
paper): international cross-country correlations, individual-level survey responses for 17 
Latin American countries, and a narrative of the case of Bolivia over the last 25 years, 
which is suggestive of a switch from a more to a less institutionalized equilibrium. Section 
6 briefly discusses one extension introducing more than one alternative political 
technology. It suggests an equilibrium complementarity across the use of various such 
                                                            
5 As mentioned in Section 4, two countries of similar levels of development (Argentina and Chile) present a 
very stark contrast in the dynamics of institutionalization of Congress, the political party system, the Judiciary 
and the Bureaucracy after the democratization process of the 1980s.  All these institutions are much weaker in 
Argentina than in Chile (contrast Spiller and Tommasi 2007 with Aninat et al., 2008), and this correlates with 
higher levels of corruption and higher levels of non-institutionalized mechanisms of political pressure such as 
road blockades and the like. (Section 6 below predicts a positive correlation between corruption and the use of 
APTs).   9   
technologies (the rich bribing their way into policy favoritism is likely to coexist with the 
poor protesting in the streets). Section 7 concludes the paper by reviewing our objectives 
and results and by plotting the next steps in this agenda. 
 
2.  The General Logic: Institutional Behavior and Alternative Political 
Technologies 
 
Take any model that treats political institutions as the rules of a game in which policies are 
decided; these rules could be those that regulate elections, government formation, 
legislative procedures, judicial review, and the like. Panel (a) of Figure 1 represents that 
type of game, as in any of the various models summarized in Persson and Tabellini (2000).
 
(In the specific example we develop below, that model will be one of legislative bargaining, 




Figure 1. Policymaking Games 
 




Panel b. A broader game with two arenas 
 
 
                                                            
6 The description of those games involves also a description of the underlying economic structure and policy 
problem.  In our example below, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), that structure will consist of splitting a pie 
of fixed size.   10   
Most of those models presuppose that actors only play within those rules and within 
those institutions. As stated in the introduction, that is not a bad approximation to use in 
studying broad issues of policymaking in a number of polities today, but it seems to miss a 
very important part of the action in other cases. 
Our modeling strategy consists of calling that game the institutionalized part of the 
game—i.e., the part of a broader game (with multiple arenas) that takes place inside those 
institutionalized arenas.  To that game, we add a prior stage in which actors choose between 
participating in that institutionalized game and participating in alternative arenas.
7
Panel (b) of Figure 1 presents a scheme of this broader game. Borrowing the 
language used by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a and 2006b), we call de jure political 
power the one assigned by formal political institutions, and de facto political power the one 
assigned by the technologies of alternative political action.  For instance, if the alternative 
to institutionalized decision-making was the threat of violence, such power would be 
conferred by the capacity to exercise violence. More generally, what alternative political 
technologies are we referring to? Classifying a set of various possible political actions 
(actions to influence collective decision-making) into “institutionalized” versus 
“alternative” is to some extent an arbitrary choice.  Which way one wants to classify things 
in practice would depend on the exact question at hand.  
  Also, 
we will need to specify the feasible actions in these alternative arenas, the protocols of 
interaction within those arenas, and the protocols of interaction among formal and informal 
arenas. 
Figure 2 presents some examples of political actions.  Some of them, towards the 
left of the diagram in white, are closer to the more institutionalized end of the spectrum 
(forming a political party, writing to your congressman), while others, towards the right of 
the diagram in dark grey, are clearly within the realm of the alternative (road blockades, 
physical threats). A number of other political actions are harder to classify, including 
various forms of lobbying,
8
                                                            
7 The actors we have in mind are underlying socioeconomic groups. At the level of abstraction where we will 
be working in the simple model of Section 3, these actors will choose between (“direct democracy”) 
participation in a legislative assembly, and exercising alternative action elsewhere.  Clearly, enriching the 
details of political agency by explicitly modeling representative democracy is a next step in the agenda. 
 as well as public demonstrations to inspire sympathy in public 
8 Lobbying by interest groups is an activity that has been well studied in political economy and in political 
science.  The best know treatment by economists is that of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001). We believe 
that some forms of lobbying, within certain rules, would fit more naturally in the “institutionalized” part of   11   
opinion (Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 2008). Some actions such as capital flight to avoid 
excessive taxation are in principle part of the economic side of the model and not part of 
the political action space, unless they involve explicit political coordination.
9 Strategies 
employed by trade unions, for instance, vary from the extremely institutionalized (“playing 
golf with Republican legislators”), to the constitutionally sanctioned right to strike 
exercised impeccably, to the borderline-criminal physical intimidation utilized in  some 
countries at some points in time.
10
 
  Going into the darker side of Figure 2 and of reality, 
some strategies we would have no doubt in classifying as “alternative,”  such  as  that  
exercised by Colombian drug lords when offering new judges the choice between plata 
(bribes) or plomo (bullets), described in Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di Tella (2006). 
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the game—as when Grossman and Helpman say, referring to the US, “according to the survey findings, the 
activities undertaken by the greatest numbers of organized interest groups are those intended to educate and 
persuade lawmakers of the wisdom of the groups’ position.” (Grossman and Helpman, 2001: 4).  Other forms 
of business influence (quite prevalent in several Latin American countries and various other places) are much 
closer to the darker part of Figure 2.  Understanding why some forms of business participation in 
policymaking are more prevalent than others across different polities is an important pending research 
question; see Schneider (2009) and Spiller and Liao (2008) for some relevant insights. We believe that some 
of the logic of this paper, properly adjusted, could be helpful in thinking about those issues. 
9  Such explicit coordination by business actors is pervasive in many  accounts of politics and economic 
policymaking in developing countries.  See for instance Dornbusch and Edwards (1991), Bruno (1993), and 
Fanelli and McMahon (2006).  
10 See for instance Murillo and Schrank (2009), Farber (1986), Przeworski (1985) and Austin-Smith et al 
(2008).   12   
 
In the rest of the paper we will work at some level of abstraction, focusing on a 
“black or white” classification in which some actions will take place clearly within the 
“institutional” realm and others clearly outside formal institutional channels.
11
In the model, we will be assuming that the decisions to take the institutional road or 
the “street” road are indeed alternatives.  This is a simplified way of capturing an important 
point of our argument, which emphasizes the investment component of institutions.
  For 
concreteness, we will speak as if the alternative political technology (APT) in question 
involves road blockades or street protests, but in principle, the abstract formulation we 
utilize could also represent technologies such as collective action by some economic sectors 
that could damage the economy.  The choice of road blockades as our illustration is not 
accidental, since at the time of this writing road blockades are a common form of political 
action,  influencing decisions taken in more formal arenas in various Latin American 
countries such as Argentina and Bolivia (see Section 5). 
12
                                                            
11  Our use of the terms institutions and institutionalization shifts back and forth between more formal 
theoretical notions and more commonplace usage.  One can (as we do in our model) assign a great deal of 
structure to actions “in the street” and in a strict sense call such actions highly “institutionalized.”  That said,  
most people who are not professional social scientists  would agree to call bargaining in Congress more 
institutional behavior than burning tires in the street (no matter how structured the latter activity might be). 
  One 
can think of examples in which certain political actors will take different roads depending 
on what the environment has to offer them.  For instance, there will be circumstances in 
which business interests will invest more resources in strengthening right-wing political 
parties and think tanks that defend their general interests (as they do in Chile) than in 
bribing politicians, judges, or bureaucrats to obtain special privileges for their firm or sector 
(as they do in Argentina).  As extensively recognized in the literature on democratization, 
current political losers might accept their short-term fate gracefully and invest in doing 
better in the electoral and coalitional arena next time, or they can use violence in an attempt 
12  Political actions such as voting, campaigning for your favorite candidate, writing letters to your 
Congressperson,  participating in peaceful protests, participating in violent protests, threatening to kill your 
opponents, or killing Supreme Court Judges need not be substitutes.  Under some conditions they are used 
jointly and under some conditions they are used separately in different political equilibria by different actors.  
A more general understanding of the conditions under which various political actions are complements or 
substitutes is an important question that we do not answer in this paper. What we do is emphasize one set of 
mechanisms, particularly investment under some constraints, which makes some actions alternative to others.  
It turns out that the particular actions we model in this paper, even though potentially complements in some 
environments, are in practice substitutes within our empirical sample. In Section 5.2 we provide evidence 
indicating that protesting in the streets and more institutionalized forms of political participation (such as 
voting or contacting your Congressman) are substitutes in most of Latin America.   13   
to change outcomes.
13  These different types of decisions have an important investment 
component and are likely to reinforce the degree of institutionalization or lack thereof over 
time.
14
The actors in our game, then, will have to make a prior decision of whether to enter 
the more formal or the less formal arenas of political action.
  An important aspect of this logic is what Aoki (2001, Chapter 5) calls the co-
evolution and complementarity of institutions and human asset types. Particular institutions 
(and institutional equilibria) will lead people to invest in assets more productive in those 
environments, reinforcing the prevalent form of institutionalization (or lack thereof). In the 
example of this paper, for instance, the type of leadership more functional for getting your 
way in Congressional bargaining might be very different from the type of leader that 
specializes in violence (or in corrupting politicians).  
15
In the next section we present one specific model of policy determination in the 
presence of formal political institutions and of alternative political technologies. In Section 
4 we return to some general considerations, using the model as explicit illustration of some 
of those considerations. 
  These decisions at the level 
of individual actors, are then aggregated in order to find an equilibrium to this broader 
game.  Both the individual choices and the polity-level equilibrium will be highlighted in 
the empirics of Section 5. 
 




Any model within the framework we are suggesting will need to specify three components 
that will constitute sets of exogenous parameters for comparative statics purposes. These 
components are: (1) policy problem (mapping from feasible policy vectors to utilities of the 
players, which subsumes aspects of the socioeconomic structure as well as available policy 
technologies); (2) political institutions; and (3) alternative political technologies (and the 
protocols of interaction among different political arenas). 
                                                            
13 See for instance Przeworski (2005), Benhabib and Przeworski (2006), and Wantchekon (2000). 
14 See for instance Pierson (2004). Recent works emphasizing the dynamics of investment in institutions 
include Besley and Persson (2007), especially Section 4, and Lagunoff (2001). 
15 Within the specific model of the next section, we have also worked out the case in which actors could 
participate in both arenas, and many of the results are the same.  Still, for substantive reasons related to the 
logic of institutions and investment explained in the text, we want to emphasize the case in which these are 
alternative arenas.   
16 The game is presented and analyzed in the text in a stylized and intuitive manner.  See the Appendix for a 
more formal treatment.   14   
3.1 Presentation of the Model 
In the example we present here, these components are specified as follows. 
 
(1) Policy problem 
The policy problem consists of splitting a pie of size 𝑋𝑋 among 𝑛𝑛 risk-neutral players.  This 
is a standard allocation problem which has been extensively studied in conjunction with the 
set of political rules we assume in (2), and it is a good general approximation for a number 
of situations where distributional issues are central. 
 
(2) Political institutions 
Political institutions consist of one variant of a well-known legislative bargaining model set 
forth by Baron and Ferejohn (1989).  Each of the 𝑛𝑛 players has an ex ante probability 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  of 
being recognized as agenda setter, with i’s ordered in such a way that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  increases in 𝑖𝑖 ; 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 < 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+1. It is more straightforward to think about this simple example being a case of direct 
democracy, in which the 𝑛𝑛 players who could go to Congress are the citizens themselves.  
Alternatively, we can think of the 𝑛𝑛  players as the underlying socioeconomic 
constituencies, each of which could be represented in Congress by a perfect agent.  (We 
refer to agency problems in Section 7).  
After the agenda setter proposes an allocation, a vote is taken among all the 
members of Congress.  If a majority accepts the proposal of the agenda setter, then that 
proposal constitutes the outcome of the collective legislative decision.  If the proposal is not 
accepted by a majority, then the collective legislative decision is a status quo allocation 
which, for simplicity, we normalize to 0 for every player. 
We use this very simple “closed rule” formulation of the legislative bargaining 
problem for brevity.  The main logic we are trying to pursue in this paper does not depend 
on any specific extensive form of the institutionalized game;
17  the crucial individual 
decisions and equilibrium features depend on comparing the expected values of 
participating in the institutionalized decision-making process with that of using 
alternatives.
18
(3) Alternative political technologies and interactions with formal political arenas 
 
                                                            
17 We are indebted to Massimo Morelli for highlighting this point. 
18 Furthermore, the expected values of the particular formulation we use are analogous to the actual allocation 
that would be obtained under an open rule protocol with no discounting between rounds.   15   
Any assumption one can make regarding alternative political technologies will embed 
(“physical” and “institutional”) considerations about the effects of those “alternative” 
actions on the utilities of players (the ones undertaking the action and the rest of the polity), 
and about collective action technologies, commitment technologies, and allocation 
protocols in informal arenas.  The main purpose of this paper is to promote the extension of 
analysis of policymaking under formal political institutions to include the explicit modeling 
of these outside options, rather than peddling any particular assumption about (or example 
of) APTs.  For concreteness, in the rest of the paper we focus on a specific example (“road 
blockades” or “going to the street”). Clearly, modifying any of the assumptions below 
constitutes an interesting exercise of comparative statics  on these alternative political 
technologies. 
Protesting has an individual cost 𝑐𝑐.  If at least 𝑇𝑇 players decide to protest they can 
(credibly) threaten to inflict a damage of size 𝐾𝐾 to the economy, with 2 ≤ 𝑇𝑇 and 0 < 𝐾𝐾 < 𝑋𝑋.  
If less than 𝑇𝑇 people protest, they cannot cause any damage.  This very simplified damage 
technology is represented in Figure 3, where 𝑚𝑚 stands for the number of people who choose 
to use this alternative. This very simple formulation captures in a stark manner some 
properties of our framework, which we discuss in more detail in the next section.
19 We also 
assume that “The Street” acts as a unified actor, ignoring collective action issues among the 
protesters (after the threshold 𝑇𝑇). Furthermore, we assume that The Street is endowed with a 
commitment technology, so that it can commit ex ante to cause or not to cause damage in 




                                                            
19 In particular it embeds a scale economy / strategic complementarity which will be the seed of multiplicity 
of equilibria. For more sophisticated treatments of this threshold logic see Lohmann (1994) and references 
therein.  The seminal model is in Granovetter (1978). 
20 For computational simplicity we will assume that whatever is given to protesters is shared equally among 
them. This could be due to the structure of programs or policies that they receive (rural protesters in Argentina 
fight for lower taxes on agricultural exports, urban protesters fight for receiving social programs).   16   
Figure 3. Damage Technology 
 
 
The timing of the game, represented in Figure 4, is as follows: 
1. At the beginning of the game, each actor (simultaneously) decides whether to go to 
Congress or to “go to the street” to protest. Let 𝑚𝑚 be the number of players that go to the 
street and 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚  the number of players that go to Congress.  We denote by ℳ the set of 
players in the street and by ????\ℳ the set of players in Congress.
21
2. Nature chooses an agenda setter μ among those players that went to Congress. Each 
player in Congress has probability 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖????\ℳ  of being recognized as the agenda setter. 
 
3. The 𝑚𝑚 actors in the street decide how much to request from Congress. Let 𝑍𝑍 denote the 
total amount they request. Given the commitment assumption, they will be making a threat 
of causing damage 𝐾𝐾 unless a total amount equal to or greater than  𝑍𝑍 is granted to them.    
4. The agenda setter in Congress proposes an allocation, a vector 𝑆𝑆𝝁𝝁 = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝝁𝝁�
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖???? of shares, 
with ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 1 and 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1].       
 5. The 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚 players in Congress vote on the agenda setter’s proposal. If more than half of 
the members of the legislature accept the proposal, it constitutes the collective legislative 
                                                            
21 As explained in the Appendix, each player chooses an action 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  ∈ {0,1}, where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  = 1  means going to 
Congress, and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  = 0  means going to the street. The summation of all 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 `s will be interpreted later as 
investment in formal institutions.   17   
decision. If 𝑆𝑆𝝁𝝁 is not accepted by a majority, then the legislative decision allocates 0 to all 
players.
22
6. Those in the street, if 𝑇𝑇 or more, decide whether to cause damage or not. (This is an 
irrelevant decision point under the assumption of commitment in 3, but we keep it here for 
future extensions). 
 Let S = {𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖???? denote the final outcome of the legislative process. 
7. The allocation is implemented.  If no damage was caused, each player receives 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋.  
If damage was caused, each player receives 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾). 
 
Figure 4. Timing of the Game 
 
 




We proceed by backward induction from the last stages of the game in Figure 4.  Given the 
assumption of commitment by protesters, stages 6 and 7 are mechanically implemented 
after decision 4-5 is made.  The latter is just a standard Baron-Ferejohn game, with a small 
twist. It is easy to show that the agenda setter will give 0 to all other players in Congress 
and allocate the whole pie (except anything given to the protesters) to himself or herself.
24
                                                            
22 Again, this very stark formulation is chosen for expositional simplicity.  
 
The novel question is how much to give to the protesters. Clearly, if 𝑚𝑚 < 𝑇𝑇, the agenda 
setter will give nothing to protesters.  If 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝑇𝑇, then the amount he or she will allocate to 
23 The solution is proven formally in the Appendix. 
24 More generally, the allocation among the 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚 players in Congress could be defined as  0 = i s for any 𝑖𝑖 
not part of the winning coalition,  ε = i s  for those 𝑖𝑖’s in the winning coalition other than the agenda setter, 
















si  for the agenda setter.  We follow the standard convention of letting ε go to zero, 
and of assuming that players who are indifferent between two actions at zero will chose the one they would 
have chosen for ε>0.   As already stated, the fact that the other members of Congress get zero is just for 
computational simplicity. What actually matters for the relevant decisions is their expected utility in Congress 
before the agenda setter was selected by nature.  This is a reduction of a richer intertemporal structure (where 
those “included” will eventually get their share) into a one-period model.   18   
the protesters will depend on the amount 𝑍𝑍 that they request. If they request 𝑍𝑍 > 𝐾𝐾, the 
agenda setter will give them nothing, since it is better to keep (𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾) than (𝑋𝑋 − 𝑍𝑍).  If they 
request  𝑍𝑍 ≤ 𝐾𝐾, then the agenda setter will grant them 𝑍𝑍.  This response will lead the 
protesters (in stage 3) to request exactly 𝑍𝑍 = 𝐾𝐾, since they will get nothing if they go above 
𝐾𝐾, and 𝐾𝐾 is preferred to anything below it. (As stated, we assume that whatever is given to 
protesters is shared equally among them, so that each protester will receive  𝐾𝐾/𝑚𝑚.)  
Given that stage 2 is a move by nature, this brings us to the key choice of arenas in 
stage 1. Given each player’s expectation of what he will receive if he goes to Congress, and 
his expectation of what he will receive if he goes to the street, each player has to decide 
between these two arenas, taking as given the choices of all the other (𝑛𝑛 − 1)  players. 
Finding equilibria to this game consists of  finding the Nash equilibrium to these 𝑛𝑛 
individual decisions.  We present the results in the following proposition, which is 
presented more formally and proven in the Appendix. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: 
(a) There always exists a Full Institutionalization Equilibrium in which everybody is in 
Congress and no alternative arenas are used. 
(b) For some parameter values, there is a Low Institutionalization Equilibrium in which 
𝑚𝑚∗actors go to the street. 
 
The existence of the Full Institutionalization Equilibrium (FIE) is guaranteed by the 
fact that if only one player chooses to be in the street, he or she will be unable to credibly 
threaten to cause any damage, and hence receive zero from the agenda setter, getting a final 
payoff of –𝑐𝑐, which is less than what he or she would expect to receive in Congress. Hence 
no one would want to deviate unilaterally from a full institutionalization equilibrium. 
Figure 5 provides an intuitive representation of the Low Institutionalization 
Equilibrium (LIE). The figure plots the value of being in Congress (the upward-sloping 
curve) and the value of being in the street (the downward-sloping curve) from the point of 
view of an individual player as a function of his/her type, under the assumption (which is 
true in the type of LIE equilibria we select)
25
                                                            
25 See Appendix. 
 that all players of lower type will be in the 
street, and all players of higher type will be in Congress.  Let 𝑚𝑚∗ be the highest integer to   19   
the left of the point where these two curves intersect. Players 1 to 𝑚𝑚∗ (those with the lowest 
ex ante probabilities of being selected agenda setter in Congress) will go to the street, and 
players 𝑚𝑚∗ + 1 to 𝑛𝑛 will go to Congress. 
 

























Go to street  Go to Congress   20   
The Full Institutionalization Equilibrium takes us back to “the world of Persson and 
Tabellini” in which the institutionalized part of the game is the only relevant one.  The Low 
Institutionalization equilibrium, on the other hand, will be characterized by  the use of 
alternative political technologies and by weakness of formal institutional arenas. 
In the next section we interpret these results and provide some comparative statics 




The simple model we have presented in Section 3 already contains the flavor of the more 
general points we want to raise in this paper.  One first result we want to highlight is the 
following: 
 
4.1 Result 1: There are Different Degrees of Institutionalization in Equilibrium. 
 
If we interpret the summation of action 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ’s  (the choice of going to Congress) as the 
aggregate investment in formal institutions, it will be technically trivial—but substantially 
important—to add the effects of these aggregate investments.  This captures in a blunt 
manner a very important aspect of the variation of institutions across countries.  In their 
choice of arena, the actors of the model are deciding whether to take the institutionalized 
route or not.  In this simple formulation the aggregation of this behavior (that is, the number 
of people operating through formal institutions) is what we can call the degree of 
institutionalization in equilibrium. 
Investing in technologies that increase strength and capabilities in the 
institutionalized game (such as getting a PhD in Public Policy) or in technologies that 
increase strength and capabilities in the street (such as buying weapons), clearly would 
have a different impact on the productivity and strength of formal institutions, as well as on 
the quality of the output the polity generates. There are various reasons (beyond our simple 
static model) why more institutionalized collective decision-making arenas will lead to 
better policies and better outcomes, such as providing a better structure for exchange of 
information and for the agreement and enforcement of intertemporal cooperation. 
According to Pierson (2004: 107) “political institutions can serve to coordinate the behavior 
and expectations of decentralized actors (Carey,  2000) and to facilitate bargaining by 
creating monitoring bodies, issue linkages, and mechanisms for making credible   21   
commitments (Keohane 1984; Weingast 2002).”  Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2009) 
show that more institutionalized policymaking environments lead to policies that are more 
stable, (yet) more adaptable to changing circumstances, more coordinated and coherent, and 
better implemented. 
Take the literal example of the institution we model here: Congress.  Legislatures 
are critical institutions in the effective functioning of a democratic system and in the 
policymaking process.  Yet, the extent and nature of the role played by legislatures in the 
policymaking process vary greatly from country to country.  The sheer magnitude of 
academic studies of the US Congress proves the importance of that institution in American 
politics and policymaking, establishing a number of relevant stylized facts: members of the 
US Congress exhibit remarkable longevity, and they tend to specialize in committees; the 
US Congress plays an active role in policymaking, it engages in considerable oversight of 
the public bureaucracy, and it is the focus and main entry point of political action by any 
interest group attempting to influence American policymaking.
26 None of these features is 
true for the Argentine Congress, in spite the fact that Argentina is a country whose 
constitutional structure has strong similarities with that of the US (Jones et al., 2002). The 
comparison can also be taken among countries of similar levels of development: the 
Chilean legislature plays a much more important role in the policymaking process of that 
country than does its Argentine counterpart.  These different roles in policymaking are 
associated with various measures of legislators’ and legislatures’ capabilities, which have a 
clear investment component: legislators’ duration, legislators’ education, degree of 
specialization in policymaking committees, resources available for policy analysis, esteem 
in the eyes of the public, and appreciation of the legislature as an important place from the 
point of view of politicians’ careers.
27  Saiegh (2009) and Stein and Tommasi (2007) 
provide wider comparisons, showing a strong correlation of such objective indicators of 
Congress capabilities with assessments about the importance of Congress in policymaking 
across 18 Latin American countries.
28
                                                            
26 See for instance Weingast and Marshall (1988), Shepsle and Weingast (1995), Diermeier, Keane and Merlo 
(2005), and Grossman and Helpman (2001) and references there. 
  
27 See, for instance Spiller and Tommasi (2008), Aninat et al. (2008), Tommasi (2008), and Saiegh (2009). 
28 In the empirical section below we provide some evidence using indicators of the strength/quality of various 
political institutions along the lines just suggested for the case of Congresses.   22   
Result 1 also relates to another important general point, central to theoretical 
discussions about the notion of institutions in institutional economics and institutional 
politics.  Academic and common usage of the term institutions refers to two related but 
distinct concepts: “institutions as rules” and “institutions as equilibria.” The most common 
cited definition of institutions in modern social science is probably that of Douglass North: 
institutions “are the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3).  A number of scholars 
have recently turned to a conception of institutions which  identifies the essence of 
institutions as being equilibrium phenomena rather than rules. Exact definitions vary among 
these authors, but the core idea is that it is ultimately the behavior of others, rather than the 
rules themselves, that induces each person to behave (or not to behave) in the way 
prescribed by the rules.
29
 
 Our model captures that distinction in a very simple framework.  
We have political institutions as rules in the allocation of de jure political power, but we 
also have different degrees of institutionalization in equilibrium, as captured by 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚∗ (and 
the associated investments).  The notion of institutions as equilibria very naturally takes us 
to the second point we want to highlight: 
4.2 Result 2: (If) Strategic Complementarities Exist, a Multiplicity of Equilibria Follows 
 
The stark assumptions of the model in Section 3 are just one example of possible forces 
leading to multiplicity of equilibria through strategic complementarities.  In the literal 
formulation we use, the strategic complementarity appears through the shape of the 
function representing the damage technology in Figure 3: if only a very small number of 
actors participate in a street blockade, they will not be able to make any credible threat of 
further damage.
30 That being the case, the incentive of an additional actor to participate in 
APTs is very low, so that (up to a point), the decision to go to the street is a strategic 
complement across players.
31
                                                            
29 See for instance Aoki (2001), Calvert (1995a, 1995b), Carey (2000), Dixit (2009), Fearon (2006), Greif 
(2006), and Greif and Kingston (2008). 
 
30  Parameters such as  𝑐𝑐  or  𝑇𝑇  in our model will depend on various issues, including the “repression 
technologies” in place.  One can also think that, in the more dynamic version of this story, institutionalized 
actors might invest resources in improving repression, which would be another detraction of resources from 
more “productive” institutional investments.  (We thank Susan Rose-Ackerman for highlighting this point). 
31 One could make somewhat equivalent assumptions in the functioning of the formal institutional arena, and 
that might give rise to a third type of equilibrium, a Non-Institutionalized Equilibrium. Coming from that 
corner could be an interesting extension if one wants to link the logic of this paper with discussion about   23   
More generally, there are a number of forces that make various actions strategic 
complements, which reinforces the tendency of this type of models to generate multiple 
equilibria.  In Section 6 we briefly discuss a simple extension with two types of alternative 
political actions, and we notice that there are reasons why a more extensive use of one APT 
is likely to induce a more extensive use of the other APT. This seems to be an example of a 
more general point: there are various reasons to believe that non-institutionalized or de-
institutionalized activities of one type are likely to induce de-institutionalized activities of 
other types. There are, then, complementarities among various non-institutionalized 
actions, as well as complementarities among various institutionalized actions.  This is 
consistent with findings in Stein and Tommasi (2007) within Latin America, and 
Scartascini et al. (2009) for a larger sample of countries, reporting a positive correlation 
across a number of measures of institutional strength in various domains (policymaking 
capabilities of Congress, party system institutionalization, Judicial independence, strength 
and independence of the bureaucracy, etc.) 
The fact that there is multiplicity of equilibria has potentially important implications 
in terms of theory, in terms of interpreting and analyzing empirical evidence, and also in 
terms of thinking about possible practical recommendations. Even using the simple two-
equilibrium model presented above, one can say the following.  If the polities we observe 
“in reality” are all in the institutionalized equilibrium, then the standard type of political 
economy model—which  presupposes that what we call the institutionalized part of the 
game is all that there is—will be the right model to describe what we observe and to 
generate empirical implications.  In that case, after this detour we would be back “in the 
world of Persson and Tabellini.”  But if, on the contrary, several or all polities are in the 
other equilibrium, we will observe plentiful use of alternative political technologies and 
polities with weaker institutions. The possibility of having different polities at different 
equilibria might also have important implications for cross-national empirical analysis on 
the effects of formal political rules on public policy. We elaborate on this point in the 
concluding section. 
Multiplicity of equilibria also implies that two countries with similar fundamentals 
(in terms of socioeconomic structure and political institutions as rules) might end up 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
moving from anarchy to some forms of institutionalization (Hirschleifer, 1995; Barzel, 2002; Dixit, 2003 and 
2009; Skaperdas, 2006;  and references there).   24   
“stuck” in different equilibria.   And as stated above, these things could create strong path 
dependence, with these different equilibria being self-reinforced by investments over time 
(Pierson, 2004). On the other hand, this multiplicity also gives rise to the possibility of 
observing equilibrium switches, a point that we develop more fully in Section 5 with the 
illustration of the Bolivian example, a country which seems to have gone from a cycle of 
institutionalization in the 1980s and 1990s to a cycle of de-institutionalization after that, the 
latter cycle  being  associated with a great increase in the use of alternative political 
technologies. 
 
4.3 Set of Results 3: Comparative Statics 
 
One important question is what are the implications of equilibrium multiplicity for 
attempting to map the predictions of the model into empirical evidence. Fortunately, the 
particularly simple structure of the model of Section 3 enables us to make some 
comparative static predictions in spite of the fact that we have multiple equilibria.  Under 
the maintained assumptions of the model, the FIE always exists, while the LIE exists for 
some parameter values and not for others. This means that for some parameter values we 
will have only the FIE (call that set of parameters F), while for other parameter values we 
can have both types of equilibrium (call that set of parameters B). If the real world were 
fully described by this model, then we would expect that in polities characterized by a 
vector of parameters belonging to F we should observe the characteristics associated with 
the FIE, while in polities characterized by a vector of parameters belonging to B we could 
observe either of the equilibria. Assigning in that latter case a non-zero probability to each 
of the equilibria will be enough to generate empirical predictions. If conducting 
comparative statics on one given parameter (say α) increases the set of other parameters for 
which LIE is an equilibrium, then we will say that increasing parameter α increases the 
possibility of observing the Low Institutionalization Equilibrium (and its associated 
properties). 
It turns out that,  in the simple structure of our model, any comparative statics 
exercise that (using the language of the previous paragraph) increases the possibility of 
LIE, also increases the number 𝑚𝑚∗  of people going to the streets within the LIE  (see 
Appendix), so that the derivative of 𝑚𝑚∗ with respect to any parameter is a sufficient statistic   25   
for the way in which that parameter affects the degree of institutionalization in either 
interpretation (within LIE, or in terms of probability of being in LIE as opposed to FIE).  
Using that logic, it is easy to show the comparative static results summarized in Table 1 
(see Appendix). 
 
Table 1. Comparative Statics 
 
Parameter 
Probability of being in the non-
institutionalized equilibrium  
(or inverse degree of 
institutionalization )  
 Cost of using APT (c) 
 
(-) 
 Damage potential (K) 
 
(+) 
 Wealth (X)   
(-) 
 
 Asymmetry distribution of  de jure 





Not surprisingly the probability of being in the LIE increases as the use of APTs 
becomes less costly, as the potential damage APTs can cause increases, and as the wealth 
of the economy decreases.  More interestingly, the probability of being in a Low 
Institutionalization Equilibrium increases as the distribution of de jure political power 
becomes more asymmetric. As the vector of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖’s becomes more asymmetric, more actors at 
the lower end of that distribution will find participation in formal political institutions less 
appealing, inducing more street action and lower institutionalization.
32
                                                            
32 This result has a clear flavor of “exclusion of the poor,” and we believe that to be an important case in 
reality. Yet, the result is more general than that, and it applies to any case in which the de jure power of a 
relevant set of political actors tends to under-represent them in comparison to their ability to put collective 
action together and threaten  economic disruption.  The very visible 2008-2009 demonstrations of rural 
producers in Argentina against  large increases in export taxes by the Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
administration are a case in point.  Those demonstrators were not the dispossessed, but a segment of the 
Argentina middle and upper class underrepresented in the Argentine political system. 
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5. Some Empirical Evidence 
 
This section suggests that the implications that can be derived from a simple model such as 
the one above, and from the more general logic presented in the paper, are not inconsistent 
with some preliminary evidence. We do not take this evidence as conclusive, but we see it 
as encouraging further theoretical and empirical work along these lines. We provide 
evidence at three levels.  Section 5.1 shows some cross-national correlations consistent with 
the predictions of the model.  Section 5.2 summarizes individual level evidence from 
Machado et al. (2009), which is also consistent with some predictions of the model. Section 
5.3 presents a narrative of events in Bolivia in the last 25 years which seems consistent with 
a switch from a more institutionalized to a less institutionalized equilibrium, along the lines 
suggested in the paper. 
 
5.1. Cross-Country Correlations 
 
The model and logic presented above imply a number of correlations.  One such 
implication would be: 
 
Implication 1: A negative correlation exists  between the strength (quality) of political 
institutions and the use of alternative political technologies. 
 
In previous work we have attempted to develop (drawing from in depth analyses of several 
Latin American countries, as well as available broader international data sources) a number 
of indicators of the workings of political institutions that seem good proxies for the strength 
of policymaking institutions as understood in this paper (see Stein and Tommasi, 2007, for 
Latin America, and Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2009) for a broader cross-section of 
countries). Those measures, which try to proxy judicial independence, congress 
capabilities, party system institutionalization, and bureaucratic quality are constructed from 
a number of international data sources (see Berkman et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive provides 
information on a number of political activities that can naturally proxy for some of the 
APTs that we emphasize in the paper.  In particular, there are measures of anti-government 
demonstrations, strikes, riots, political assassinations, guerrilla warfare, government crises,   27   
purges, and revolutions. One commonly utilized index combines the first three types of 
political activity under the heading of “Internal Conflict.” 
The measures of institutional quality tend to be negatively correlated with the 
various measures of conflict, with the coefficients being statistically significant when we 
run univariate and multivariate regressions with some standard controls such as GDPpc, 
regional dummies, level of democracy, etc.  To save on space we report here only one such 
correlation, in Figure 6, which shows the correlation between the measure of internal 
conflict and a measure of institutional strength that combines variables that capture the 










Our model also has implications for correlations among institutional and conflict variables 
with some characteristics of policy outcomes.  For instance, the following: 
 
Implication 2: A positive correlation between weaker institutions, more use of alternative 
political technologies, and favoritism in public policies.  
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* controlling for LnGDPpc and regional dummies  28   
 
De jure political institutions that generate more biased policy outcomes are likely to lead to 
increased use of alternative political technologies by the losers, and this would induce 
weaker total investments in the institutionalization of the system.  In the figure, we show 
the correlation between the APTs and a measure of biases in government policy called 





Figure 7. Correlation (Use of APTs, Favoritism in Public Policies) 
 
Certainly, we are not the first authors to report correlations such as those in Figures 6 and 7, 
and those correlations do not say anything about causality.  Further work with a more fully 
specified theoretical and empirical model will be necessary to address issues of causality. 
As a (small) step in the direction of addressing issues of causality, we have started 
to investigate individual level data for 18 Latin American countries, which lead to some 
                                                            
34 This particular variable measures whether when deciding upon policies and contracts, government officials 
usually favor well-connected firms and individuals or are neutral among firms and individuals. We have 
averaged the responses for the years for which the data is available (2002, 2005, and 2006). See Berkman et 
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interesting findings in their own right, as reported in Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi 
(2009), part of which we summarize in the next section. 
 
5.2. Individual-Level Regressions  
 
In this section we explore the effect of the degree of institutionalization on individuals’ 
propensity to participate in protest in Latin American countries.  Our analysis is based on 
data for 17 countries gathered by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 
2008. These surveys were designed to be representative of the voting-age population in 
each of the countries,
35
Among those questions there is one which is of particular interest as a dependent 
variable in our analysis: Have you participated in a protest or demonstration in the past 
twelve months? Sometimes, almost never, never. 
  with subnational units chosen randomly using  probabilities 
calculated based on the most recent census data. The survey covers a broad spectrum of 
topics ranging from assessments of the economic situation to respondents’ engagement in 
different forms of political participation. 
One interesting finding already shows up in summarizing some of these dependent 
variables at the country level.  As Figure 8 suggests, Latin American citizens view 





                                                            
35 The countries and respective number of observations are: Mexico (1,560), Guatemala (1,538), El Salvador 
(1,549), Honduras (1,522), Nicaragua (1,540), Costa Rica (1,500), Panama (1,536), Colombia (1,503), 
Ecuador (3,000), Bolivia (3,003), Peru (1,500), Paraguay (1,166), Uruguay (1,500), Brazil (1,497), Venezuela 
(1,500), Argentina (1,486), and the Dominican Republic (1,507). Chile was also surveyed, but no question on 
protest participation was asked. 
36 Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi (2009) explore this issue in more detail and provide a contrast with the 
literature on post-materialist protests in OECD countries where individuals more likely to protest are also 
more likely to use more institutionalized channels of political participation.   30   
Figure 8. Congress or the Street?(17 Latin American Countries, 2008) 
 
 
The independent variables are the expected determinants of individual participation 
in protests.  Some of those individual-level explanatory variables were chosen based on the 
literature on protest participation (surveyed in Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi, 2009).  
We additionally included the country-level institutional variables explained in Section 5.1 
above.  
We estimated a random intercepts logit estimation including country level 
covariates, and we obtained very similar results using the pooled specification with 
clustered jack-knife standard errors, which we omit due to space limitations. Table 2 
summarizes for 17 countries the analysis for the dependent variable reported participation 
in protest. (The details of the estimation are provided in Machado, Scartascini and 
Tommasi,  2009). The explanatory variables below the red line are the individual-level 
variables, most of which take the expected signs and significance.
37
                                                            
37 The cases where the results of the pooled data are a bit more surprising can be better understood by running 
the model for each individual country. Sometimes an insignificant coefficient in the pooled data masks a mix 
of positive-and-significant and negative-and-significant coefficients at the country level.  An interpretation of 
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for this paper are the country-level covariates (above the line).  Except for ratings of the 
quality of the bureaucracy, all proxies of the functioning of institutions have a negative and 
significant estimated effect on the likelihood of protest participation. The results indicate 
that stronger institutions and less biased policies are associated with a lower tendency to 
use the alternative political technology of protests.   
                                                                                                                                                                                 
this country-level variation is provided in Machado et al. (2009) and it is broadly consistent with the general 
logic of this paper.  Countries with better institutions present patterns of protest participation somewhat 
different from countries with very poor institutions.   32   
Table 2. Who Protests? Individual-Level Data 
 









Institutional Stregth Index -0.398***
(0.126)
Respect Institutions -0.032** -0.031** -0.032** -0.032** -0.031**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Parties Represent 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Experience with Corruption 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.276***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Interpersonal Trust 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Vote for Opponent 0.284*** 0.281*** 0.286*** 0.284*** 0.281***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Extreme Ideology 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Interest in Politics 0.404*** 0.403*** 0.404*** 0.403*** 0.403***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Understand Politics 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.111** 0.110** 0.111** 0.111** 0.110**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Education 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Income) 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Constant -2.506*** -3.530*** -2.961*** -3.821*** -3.536***
(0.611) (0.284) (0.596) (0.466) (0.281)
Observations 13968 13968 13968 13968 13968
R-squared . . . . .
Number of pais 17 17 17 17 17
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses  33   




Bolivia, like most of Latin America, returned to democratic rule in the 1980s, following a 
history of short-lived democratic experiences interrupted by military dictatorships.  In the 
words of Fabrice Lehoucq “although the history of Bolivia is filled with extra-constitutional 
seizures of power and military governments, by the mid-1980s it had become a stable 
country. Political succession had become orderly with the 1985 election of the MNR’s 
leader Victor Paz Estenssoro.” “Paz’s final presidency marked the beginning of fifteen 
years of stable democracy” (Lehoucq, 2008: 112). 
Not only did the general notion of democracy as acceptance of electoral results 
begin to take hold, but there was also an increased and strengthened role for some specific 
institutional arenas  such as political parties and Congress.  “Both left and right in the 
country’s multiparty system agreed to abide by election results, no matter how unpalatable 
these might be” (Lehoucq, 2008: 113). “During the 1980s and 1990s traditional political 
parties played the most important role in the policymaking process . . . . After the recovery 
of democracy in 1982, the Legislative branch played a paramount role in Bolivia” (Jemio et 
al., 2009: 19). 
Anyone who follows international news would immediately recognize that 
somewhere along the line over the last decade this process of institutionalization came to a 
halt and, furthermore, it has reversed dramatically. More directly to the point of this paper, 
the Bolivian political and policymaking process has moved “from Congress to the streets.”  
According to Jemio, Candia and Evio,  
 
it is evident from the discussion above that the policymaking process in 
Bolivia has experienced dramatic shifts over time. Traditional political 
parties have lost legitimacy and representation, and social movements have 
become paramount players in the policymaking process. Regional 
organizations and regional governments have also acquired a significant 
leverage in the policymaking process. Congress has also experienced a 
                                                            
38 This section draws extensively from Jemio, Candia and Evio (2009), Lehoucq (2008), and Evia, Laserna, 
and Skaperdas (2008). Actually, the connection between this paper and the Bolivian evidence runs both ways: 
it was our reading of the Bolivian experience what gave us the final push to write the paper. We are indebted 
to Luis Carlos Jemio (former Finance Minister of Bolivia) and to Fabrice Lehoucq (one of the foremost 
experts on Bolivian politics in US academia) for valuable discussions of the Bolivian case.  They are not 
responsible for our (possibly faulty) interpretation of the case.   34   
significant lost of legitimacy as a key arena in the policymaking process. 
The streets on the other hand seem to have an upper hand in influencing the 
policymaking process . . . . Finally, the representative democracy system has 
lost ground to a more participative and direct type of democracy, where 
currencies such as the “cabildo,” the referendum and the assembly are 
dominant in the policymaking process. 
 
The above description of the changes in the Bolivian policymaking process seems 
quite consistent with a switch from a more institutionalized to a less institutionalized 
equilibrium according to the logic of this paper.  Furthermore, various details of this 
process also seem consistent with the details of our model.   
According to the model, one of the factors likely to lead to people taking the streets 
as opposed to investing in playing within institutions is the perception that the 
institutionalized system generates results biased against their interests. According to Jemio, 
Candia and Evio (2009): 
 
exclusion was a  norm  for  organizing  ruling coalitions that  were not 
infrequently fraught of corruption
39
 
 . . . .  As Congress and political parties 
lost their representativeness of the population, citizen’s organizations were 
active and vocal in channeling their demands. These organizations were not 
part of the national policymaking process . . . . Therefore their voice was 
only heard when they exerted some sort of pressure. . . . Road blockades, 
strikes, marches, hunger strikes, were the means by which these 
organizations fought and attained their objectives.  These mechanisms have 
proven to be increasingly effective to the point of almost replacing the 
formal policymaking process.  
The latter statements reflect the increased collective action of alternative political 
organizations, the lowering of participation costs in the street, and the increased used of 
these alternative venues to pressure for policy benefits. 
                                                            
39 See the extension in the next section to the alternative political technology of bribes, where we predict that 
more extensive use of this technology (more bribes, i.e., more corruption) is likely to lead to more protests 
and to lower institutionalization.   35   
All this complex process which we have very sketchily and selectively described 
(we refer the reader to Jemio, Candia and Evio, 2009; Lehoucq, 2008, and Evia, Laserna 
and Skaperdas, 2008, for much richer treatments and further references), is not without 
costs.  Among the various costs and threats that the Bolivian polity faces in its current state, 
we highlight one of particular relevance for the general point of this paper: these new 
arenas are far worse than others for internalizing long-term agreements and objectives.  In 
the words of Jemio, Candia and Evia: “Policy objectives have become essentially short- 
sighted and productivity goals have been largely neglected.”  
 
6. An Extension: More than One Alternative Political Technology 
 
The alternative political technology we have explicitly emphasized in the paper is a labor-
intensive one that seems to “favor” the poor and politically excluded.  Even within the 
narrow confines of our model,  however, that is not necessarily the only possible 
interpretation, since what the model really says is that those who are underrepresented in 
formal political institutions vis-à-vis their capacity for alternative political action are likely 
to undertake such actions.  As suggested by the example of Argentina mentioned above, 
those actors are not necessarily the economically excluded. In the case of Argentina one of 
the most vocal actors in “the street” have been middle class and upper middle class 
agricultural producers who tend to be underrepresented in the Argentine political system 
due to some peculiarities of its federalism (Tommasi, 2006, 2008 and references therein), 
and that have “somehow” recently found their way into collective action on the roads.
40
Nonetheless, an interesting extension would consist of a richer set of APTs with 
different types of socioeconomic actors having differential access to each of the 
technologies.  One technology used extensively throughout the world and in Latin America 
is the one that gives some particularly well-placed or well-endowed actors privileged access 
  
This suggests that the bare formulation of the APT in our model is indeed more generally 
applicable than it seems at first glance. 
                                                            
40 Similar cases are those of truck drivers in France, or trade unions more generally.  Trade unions in Latin 
America tend to represent not the lowest quintiles of the income distribution but the mid and in some cases 
even upper quintiles (Schneider and Karchner, 2007; Saavedra and Tommasi, 2007), and they are certainly 
political actors with privileged access to some traditional but also to some alternative political technologies.  
(As mentioned in Section 7, their access to de jure political power might well be a historical response to their 
de facto political power, along the lines of Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, as described by Collier and Collier 
1979).    36   
to the policymaking process. Such technology (“bribes”), unlike the one modeled so far, 
seems to be the realm of the rich.  
In a companion paper (Scartascini, Tommasi and Trucco, 2009) we are working on 
an extension in which there are two APTs: bribes and road blockades.  One of the main 
intuitions that is emerging from that ongoing exercise is the presence of a strategic 
complementarity between the use of bribes and the use of road blockades.  In one simple 
formulation we have already worked out, bribes operate as a wedge that lowers the value of 
what is obtained through institutional channels, inducing substitution towards the street (as 
will be induced by any cost, say agency cost, of using formal institutions).  Another route 
that we are still exploring emphasizes the asymmetry of access to this bribe technologies; in 
reduced form this seems to have the same effects as a more uneven distribution of de jure 
political power, which we have already shown to increase action in the streets.  In that way, 
we can see “bribes by the rich” and “protests by the poor” as countervailing forces that tend 
to happen together in polities with weaker political institutions.
41
Such an extension generates empirical correlations similar in spirit to the ones 
presented in Section 5. We expect bribes to be positively correlated with the use of other 
alternative political technologies such as protests, and negatively correlated with  the 
strength of institutions.  Figures 9 and 10 show some correlations generated with similar 
data and procedures as those described in Section 5.  The proxies for bribes we are using 
are various measures of (high level) corruption as reported by Transparency International, 
the International Country Risk Guide, the Global Corruption Barometer, and the World 
Economic Forum. Similar patterns are found with the individual level data; for instance 
Table 2 shows that a higher perception of corruption increases the likelihood of protest. The 
remark about the fact that we are not the first to identify these correlations and about the 
insufficient evidence on causality also applies, but it is still encouraging that our model is 
consistent with these factual correlations.  
 
 
                                                            
41 Some of these results are proven in Trucco (2009).   37   
Figure 9. Correlation (Corruption, Protests) 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The objective of this paper is to suggest a framework (a modeling strategy) to articulate 
insights from the rich literature  on the effects of political institutions on policy into a 
broader view of policymaking, by endowing political actors with a larger action space. 
Such an effort could prove particularly useful for the study of policymaking in developing 
democracies, as well as for integrating such analyses across countries of different levels of 
economic and institutional development. 
The framework we suggest allows generating comparative statics predictions from 
economic structure, formal political rules, and alternative political technologies, to the 
workings of institutions, the use of alternative political technologies, and policy outcomes. 
The model presented in this paper has the following implications. 
 
1.   Different countries have different degrees of institutionalization in their 
policymaking process. 
2.   There is multiplicity of equilibria. This allows: similar countries to be 
stuck at different levels of institutionalization, self-reinforcing dynamics, 
as well as the possibility of equilibrium switches (as the one documented 
for the Bolivian case). 
3.  The possibility of institutionalized policymaking increases as the cost of 
alternative political actions increases, as the damage these alternatives 
can cause decreases, and as the economy becomes wealthier. 
4.   In cases in which the distribution of de jure  political power is very 
asymmetric, it is more likely to observe use of alternative political 
technologies as well as low degrees of institutionalization. 
5.   High costs or inefficiencies (for instance due to agency problems) in the 
use of formal political institutions can lead to the use of alternative 
political technologies as well as to low degrees of institutionalization. 
6.   There are some strategic complementarities across the use of different 
alternative political technologies.  For instance, the use of bribes by the 
rich is likely to occur at the same time as the use of street demonstrations 
by the poor. 
   39   
There are various pending tasks in the agenda described in the paper.  Many of them 
consist of enriching various aspects of the model to permit comparative static exercises on 
economic structure, alternative political technologies, and formal political institutions. To 
begin with, one can give more detailed structure to the economy and/or more specific 
characteristics to the actors in the policy game game.  One set of actors of special relevance 
might be, for instance, trade unions, which would be associated with a particular set of 
institutionalized and non-institutionalized technologies.  The choice of a more  or less 
institutionalized strategy might depend on the advantages offered by each course of action, 
as a function of formal political institutions and of the space of feasible mappings from 
policy to utilities of their members (Murillo and Schrank, 2009). 
In our description of alternative political technologies so far, we have presented a 
fairly “flat” topography.  In reality, the costs and potential effects of various forms of 
collective action are distributed in much more specific manners.  For instance, the various 
𝑐𝑐(𝑖𝑖)’s of different actors could be a function of who else is participating in that activity, 
facilitating collective action across particular sets of agents, such as urban consumers or  
workers in sectors with high “damage capacity,” among others. More generally, there are 
various structural, historical, and perceptual factors that affect specific forms of collective 
action such as protests.
42
Perhaps the most natural set of extensions would come from fishing in the abundant 
pond of formal models of political institutions for various aspects which might allow for 
richer institutional comparative statics.  For instance, what would be the effect of 




In order to answer such questions,  one will need to move in the direction of 
representative democracy, with models that permit exploring the electoral connection and 
 What would be the effect of alternative regime types 
(parliamentary of presidential) on the degree of institutionalization of policymaking? 
                                                            
42 𝑐𝑐(𝑖𝑖)’s as well as potential rewards from such activities will be a function not only of who else protests, but 
also of the history of organization of such movements (as seen in the Bolivian case), and of the beliefs about 
the legitimacy of the protest by other actors who might matter for the degree of repression.  That is, for 
instance, why some forms of protest in France are very common, while others are quickly repressed. 
43 One might hypothesize that proportional representation systems, by allowing a better representation of 
minorities might lead to more symmetric distributions of de jure  political power and hence to more 
institutionalized behavior.  For instance, unions are known to make less frequent use of strikes in such 
systems.  On related issues, see Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007).   40   
agency issues.  Citizen-candidate models a la Besley and Coate (1997) or Osborne and 
Slivinski (1996) might constitute a natural step in that direction. 
An exercise which could be attempted and that is close in spirit to the main points of 
this paper would be to study “hyperpresidentialism as an  equilibrium.” 
Hyperpresidentialism is an important concern of political scientists about the tendency of 
presidents in Latin America, Russia, and other developing presidential democracies to over-
stretch their formal powers and to govern with little consideration for the legislative (and 
often judicial) branches.  Some of the logic developed here (and in line with well-known 
work by Weingast, 1997) might be used to study that tendency as something happening in 
weakly-institutionalized equilibria, in such a way that an identical set of formal rules might 
lead to different forms of equilibrium behavior.
44
From our logic of equilibria with different degrees of institutionalization, there 
might be important considerations for the econometric analysis of the effects of 
constitutional rules on policymaking and performance.  Even beyond the very relevant 
issues of measurement and methodology raised in Persson and Tabellini (2003), Acemoglu 
(2005), and elsewhere, the logic of this paper sheds some new light (and possible shadows) 
on such exercises.  It might be the case that the effects of constitutional rules on 
policymaking and performance will be conditional on the type of equilibrium achieved by 
each polity.  The standard literature gives a number of predictions that are conditional on 
the fact of being at a full institutionalization equilibrium.  Each such prediction needs to be 
explored under the assumption of being in a low institutionalization equilibrium.  Then, one 
needs to consider the possibility that the parametric changes implicit in the comparative 
statics might lead to equilibrium switches.   How to take such more involved predictions to 
econometric analysis is an issue that exceeds what we can say now, but that is worth 
exploring in future work.  “Institutionalization” variables like the ones described in Section 
5 (and more fully in Scartascini et al 2009) might become handy in such efforts. 
 
The model and logic we have presented here has treated constitutional rules as 
exogenous, a natural first modeling step (Diermeier and Krehbiel, 2003).  This can be 
embedded in a richer game in which such rules are chosen at an earlier stage, having our 
                                                            
44  Saiegh (2009) shows varying degrees of importance of Congress in policymaking in different Latin 
American countries.  As suggested in IDB (2005), the tendency of the executive to attempt to govern without 
Congress is not monotonically related to legislative powers of the president or other constitutional features.   41   
model here as a continuation subgame. Such modeling strategy would be quite 
complementary to the Acemoglu-Robinson (2005) logic, providing a bit more structure to 







                                                            
45 As highlighted earlier such logic could be applied to study the distribution of de jure political power of 
fairly specific socioeconomic actors or organized groups such as trade unions. See also Boix (1999) and 
Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007).   42   
Appendix 
 
A.1 The Game 
 
There are 𝑛𝑛 risk-neutral players. The set of players is ???? = {1,2,…𝑛𝑛}.  The economy is 
subject to the aggregate constraint ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 𝑋𝑋.  Each player maximizes his piece of the pie 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0, net of a possible cost 𝑐𝑐 that they pay in some cases.  Each agent is endowed with 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 
units of de jure political power, with 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 < 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+1, and ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 = 1. The timing of the game is 
as follows. 
Stage 1: Each player (simultaneously) chooses an action 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  ∈ {0,1}, where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  = 1  means 
going to Congress, and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  = 0 means going to the street; which carries a cost 𝑐𝑐.  Let 𝑚𝑚 be 
the number of players who go to the street, and 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚 the number of players who go to 
Congress. Let ℳ denote the set of players in the street, and ????\ℳ the set of players in 
Congress. 
Stage 2: Among those that went to Congress, Nature will choose an agenda setter 𝜇𝜇.  Each 
player 𝑖𝑖 in Congress will have a probability 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ????\ℳ
 of being recognized as the agenda 
setter. 
Stage 3: Assumption A1: The 𝑚𝑚 players in the street become a unitary actor, “The Street.”
46 
Assumption A2: The Street splits whatever it receives equally among its members. 
Assumption A3: The Street is endowed with a commitment technology; the players in the 
street can (credibly) threaten to cause damage 𝑑𝑑 as a function of the share 𝑧𝑧 of the total pie 
received by each of them. Let 𝑇𝑇 ≥ 2 be threshold of critical mass for action in the street. If 
𝑚𝑚 < 𝑇𝑇, the amount of damage they can cause is zero, that is 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) = 0 for all 𝑧𝑧.  If 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝑇𝑇, 
𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧):[0,1] → {0,𝐾𝐾}. Let 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧)𝑖𝑖𝜖𝜖, where 𝜖𝜖  is the set of functions  mapping  [0,1]  onto 
{0,𝐾𝐾}.
47
Stage 4: After listening to the threat of The Street, the agenda setter in Congress (𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇) 
proposes an allocation, a vector of shares 𝑆𝑆𝝁𝝁 = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝝁𝝁�
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖????, subject to ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 ≤ 1  and 
  (We assume for brevity that the range of the damage function can only take 
discrete values 0 or 𝐾𝐾, but nothing of substance will change if we let a continuous range 
𝑑𝑑 ∈ [0,𝐾𝐾].) 
                                                            
46 In the text of the paper we use 𝑍𝑍 = 𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧 to denote the total amount received by all those in the street. 
47 If nobody goes to the street (𝑚𝑚 = 0), this stage becomes irrelevant (as does stage 6), and the game reduces 
to a traditional legislative bargaining game with only stages 2, 4, and 5.  (Stage 7 trivially implements what is 
decided in 5).   43   
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1]; that is, 𝑆𝑆𝝁𝝁(𝑑𝑑):𝜖𝜖 → ∆𝑛𝑛.  For brevity we introduce the ex post distributional 
assumption A2 as an ex ante constraint on the agenda setter’s proposal, by requiring at this 
stage that 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝝁𝝁 = 𝑧𝑧 𝝁𝝁 for all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℳ. 
Stage 5: The 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚 players in Congress vote on 𝑆𝑆𝝁𝝁. Let 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖  ∈ {0,1} denote the voting 
choice of legislator 𝑖𝑖, where 0 and 1 respectively represent voting against and for the agenda 
setter’s proposal. We will assume that legislators vote only on the basis of their individual 
share, so that 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖):[0,1] → {0,1}.  To avoid some sources of multiplicity not germane to 
the objectives of this paper, we assume that in case of indifference, 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖  = 1 (assumption 
A4).



















 .   
 
Stage 6 (from the text) is mechanically implemented given our commitment assumption.   
Stage 7: The allocation is implemented.  If no damage was caused, each player receives 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋.  If damage was caused, each player receives 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾). The parameters of 
the game are 𝑛𝑛,𝑋𝑋,𝐾𝐾,𝑇𝑇,𝑐𝑐,{𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛 . 
                                                            
48 In this way we get rid of two sources of multiplicity.  On the one hand, we are considering only equilibria in 
which voters do not choose weakly dominated strategies, having them always act as if they were pivotal.  On 
the other hand, we make the payoff given to members of the winning legislative coalition converge to their 
status quo payoff. 
49 Nothing of substance will change if we let the legislative status quo vector of shares be non-zero. This 
could be an additional source of heterogeneity, all of which is captured here in an ex ante sense by the vector 
of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖’s.   44   
A.2 Solution of the Game 
Let Γ denote a partition of the set of players into ℳ and ????\ℳ. Take any Γ and any 
realization of the agenda setter 𝜇𝜇 consistent with that Γ, and call 𝐺𝐺(Γ,𝜇𝜇) the game from 
stage 3 onwards with partition of players Γ and agenda setter 𝜇𝜇. The equilibrium play of 
that game will generate payoffs 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖(Γ,𝜇𝜇) for each player 𝑖𝑖. We will solve the game in two 
steps: first we will find the (subgame perfect) equilibrium for any 𝐺𝐺(Γ,𝜇𝜇), and then we will 
find Nash equilibria to the venue choices of all players in stage 1, having the expected 







� constitute a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium for 𝐺𝐺(Γ,𝜇𝜇) if: 
 𝐺𝐺(Γ,𝜇𝜇). 
1.  For all 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧), 𝑆𝑆𝝁𝝁: 
𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖
∗�𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖




, for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖????\ℳ. 




, for all 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧): 
𝑆𝑆𝝁𝝁∗(𝑑𝑑) maximizes payoff to the agenda setter µ. 





𝑑𝑑∗(𝑧𝑧) maximizes payoffs to The Street. 
 
We solve 𝐺𝐺(Γ,𝜇𝜇) by backward induction from stage 5 to stage 3. 
Stage 5: given the status quo payoffs of zero, assumption A4 assures that any proposal 
greater or equal to zero will be accepted by all members of Congress. This implies  
                𝑆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑆𝜇𝜇.                    (1) 
Stage 4: given (1), 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝝁𝝁 = 0 ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ ????\ℳ\{μ}, since the agenda setter will try to keep as much 
of the pie as possible for himself.  With regards to how much to give to The Street, the 
decision depends on the number of players in the street, as well as on the amount they 
request.  In case of 𝑚𝑚 < 𝑇𝑇, given that 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) = 0 ∀z, there is no reason to give anything to 
the street, and 𝑧𝑧𝜇𝜇 = 0. If 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝑇𝑇, then the amount given to The Street by the agenda setter 
will depend on the 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧)  function. The agenda setter will pick the lowest 𝑧𝑧  such that   45   
𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) = 0, and compare giving that 𝑧𝑧 to all players in the street, to giving them 0 and 
suffering the damage 𝑑𝑑(0). Hence, the setter’s problem consists of  
      max𝑧𝑧�{1 − 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑧𝑧̂}𝑋𝑋,𝑋𝑋 − 𝑑𝑑(0)�,                         (2) 
where 𝑧𝑧̂ = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{𝑧𝑧|𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) = 0}. 
Stage 3: (The problem for The Street is trivial when 𝑚𝑚 < 𝑇𝑇; we focus on the case 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 𝑇𝑇.) 
The Street’s problem consists of maximizing 𝑧𝑧 subject to (2). Given that in the second 
option they get zero, their problem reduces to announcing a function 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧)  that: (i) 
minimizes 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑑𝑑(0): and (ii) minimizes {1 − 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑧𝑧̂}𝑋𝑋, subject to  {1 − 𝑚𝑚 × 𝑧𝑧̂}𝑋𝑋 ≥ 𝑋𝑋 −
𝑑𝑑(0).  (i) implies 𝑑𝑑(0) = 𝐾𝐾. (ii) implies 
𝐾𝐾
𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋 = 𝑧𝑧̂.  Any function 𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) that satisfies those 
two conditions constitutes a solution to The Street’s problem.  For brevity we focus on 
𝑑𝑑(𝑧𝑧) = �
𝐾𝐾  𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  𝑧𝑧 <
𝐾𝐾
𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋
0 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑧𝑧 ≥ 
𝐾𝐾
𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋
                                                  (3) 
The above reasoning can be summarized in the following Lemma.
50
Lemma 1: under the maintained assumptions of the model, subgame perfect equilibria to 
G(Γ,µ) will imply the following equilibrium play: 
 
(a) If m<T: 
⋅  The Street announces anything. 
⋅  The agenda setter proposes 𝑆𝑆𝜇𝜇 = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝝁𝝁�
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖???? such that 
                                                  𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝜇 = �
1               𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇 
0               𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝜇𝜇                                            (4) 
⋅  All players in Congress accept the proposal. 
⋅  No damage is caused. 
⋅  The allocation is 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = �
𝑋𝑋               𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇 
0               𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝜇𝜇 
 
(b) If m≥T: 
⋅  The Street announces (3). 
                                                            
50 In the case in which 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑛𝑛, there will be no one in Congress; but it is easy to see that 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑛𝑛 cannot 
happen in equilibrium, since in that case any player switching venues would become the agenda setter and 
increase his payoff.   46   
⋅  The agenda setter proposes 𝑆𝑆𝝁𝝁 = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝜇�




𝑋𝑋 �                                       𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇
0                                𝑖𝑖 ∈ ????\ℳ\{μ}
 𝐾𝐾
𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋 �                                       𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℳ
                                                                    (5) 
⋅  All players in Congress accept the proposal. 
⋅  No damage is caused. 
⋅  The allocation is 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = �
𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾                                      𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇
0                                𝑖𝑖 ∈ ????\ℳ\{μ}
 𝐾𝐾 𝑚𝑚 �                                       𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℳ
 
 
From Lemma 1 it is easy to compute the continuation values of the different configurations 
of venue choices in stage 1, before 𝜇𝜇 is realized in stage 2. These expected values from 
venue choice 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , as a function of all other players’ choices ????−???? ,will constitute the elements 
of the payoff matrix of the stage 1 game. 
 
Step 2. Nash Equilibria of Stage 1 Game. 
There are two types of equilibria in this game: (a)  Full Institutionalization Equilibria 
(FIE) in which all players choose to go to Congress and a standard Baron-Ferejohn game 
results from stage 2 onwards, and (b) Low Institutionalization Equilibria (LIE) in which 
𝑚𝑚∗ > 0 players go to the street.  In the next step we show that a FIE exists for all parameter 
values under our maintained assumptions.  After that, we analyze Low Institutionalization 
Equilibria. 
It is easy to see that if everybody is in Congress, nobody wants to deviate from that, 
for all the feasible parameters of the game. If everybody was in Congress, and one player 
was to deviate and go to the street, the number of players in the street would be one, which 
is smaller than 𝑇𝑇 and hence insufficient to produce any damage.  The allocation resulting 
from that path will lead to 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 0 for the deviating player. His payoff in the street will then 
be equal to –𝑐𝑐, while his expected payoff in Congress would have been  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋.  This 
deviation is never profitable. (Notice that the continuation of the game in this type of 
equilibrium is as specified in part (a) of Lemma 1).   47   
We now proceed to characterize Low Institutionalization Equilibria.  Let Γ∗ denote 
a partition being considered as possible equilibrium, with ℳ∗  its associated set (with 
measure 𝑚𝑚∗) of players in the street. In any LIE it has to be the case that no player in the 
street wants to switch to Congress and no player in Congress wants to switch to the street.  
It is easy to see from Lemma 1 that it is not possible to have a LIE in which m*<T, since in 
such case players in the street would be receiving a payoff of −𝑐𝑐, which would be 
dominated by the expected payoff in Congress to anyone switching. Hence in any LIE the 
continuation game has to be as specified in part (b) of Lemma 1. 
For a partition to be an equilibrium one, it has to be the case that no player in 
Congress would rather be in the street.  That is, ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ ????\ℳ∗: 
 
                                           (𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾)�
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 𝑗𝑗∈????\ℳ∗ � ≥
𝐾𝐾






𝑚𝑚∗+1 − 𝑐𝑐� ≡ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿(Γ∗);                                      (6) 
so that 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿(Γ∗) constitutes the lowest possible 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 that will rather stay in Congress for an 
arbitrary partition Γ∗.  Condition (6) is necessary for Γ∗ to be an equilibrium partition. 
A similar reasoning can be applied to players in the street, only that two situations have to 
be considered in that case, depending on whether the number of players in the street m∗ 
induced by Γ∗ is equal to or greater than 𝑇𝑇. 
For Γ∗such that 𝑚𝑚∗ > 𝑇𝑇 to be an equilibrium partition, it has to be the case that 
∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℳ∗: 
𝐾𝐾
𝑚𝑚∗ − 𝑐𝑐 ≥ (X − K)�
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖










≡ 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈(Γ∗).                                 (7) 
For Γ∗such that 𝑚𝑚∗ = 𝑇𝑇 to be an equilibrium partition, it has to be the case that ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℳ∗: 
𝐾𝐾
𝑇𝑇
− 𝑐𝑐 ≥ X�
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 𝑗𝑗∈????\ℳ∗
�, 
which implies   48   
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≤






≡ 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈(Γ∗).                                  (7’) 
The difference between (7’) and (7) lies in the absence of the term 𝐾𝐾 in the denominator, 
since when 𝑚𝑚∗ = 𝑇𝑇, anyone moving from the street to Congress will make The Street’s 
threat of damage no longer feasible.
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(6) and (7) are necessary and sufficient conditions for Γ∗such that 𝑚𝑚∗ > 𝑇𝑇 to be an 
equilibrium partition.  (6) and (7’) are necessary and sufficient conditions for Γ∗such that 
𝑚𝑚∗ = 𝑇𝑇 to be an equilibrium partition.   
 
These conditions allow for two types of LIE: one in which the partition is such that 
the greatest 𝑖𝑖 in ℳ∗ is smaller than the least 𝑖𝑖 in ????\ℳ∗, that is all types in Congress are 
larger than all types in the street (call those LIE1); and one in which that condition is not 
satisfied (LIE2). In the rest of this appendix as well as in the text we focus on equilibria 
LIE1, and reserve the terminology LIE to refer to LIE1. Other than being more intuitive 
and allowing for a briefer exposition of the subsequent analysis, this choice can be justified 
by two results proven in an additional appendix, available upon request: (i) for any vector 
of parameters for which a LIE2 exists, there exists also a LIE1; and (ii) if we take two 
partitions Γ and Γ′ with the same number of players in each venue (𝑚𝑚 and 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚) that 
differ only on the venue choice of one player from each arena (say players 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 switch 
places), the sum of utilities of those two players will be higher in the partition in which the 
higher type is in Congress and the lower type is in the Street. 
We analyze now the parameter values under which LIE exists. We can explain the 
results with the visual aid of Figure A-1.  Let the horizontal axis represent ℝ+ as well as the 






                                                            
51 The fact that the bound has the form 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 depends on (𝑋𝑋 − 𝐾𝐾) − �𝐾𝐾
𝑚𝑚∗ � − 𝑐𝑐� ≥ 0 for the 𝑚𝑚∗ of the 
partition under consideration.  Otherwise the condition would be of the form 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 with 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 < 0, so that  
nobody who has been assigned to the street would want to move, and we might have various ways of 
partitioning people across venues for some parameter values. All the logic of the analysis below goes through 
also in that case.  In particular, see the distinction between LIE1 and LIE2 below: when selecting to focus on 
LIE1, we are leaving aside such sources of multiplicity.   49   








             
 










𝑇𝑇1 < 𝑚𝑚∗ → ∃ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
𝑇𝑇2 = 𝑚𝑚2
∗ → ∃ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
𝑇𝑇3 = 𝑚𝑚3
∗ → ∄ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
𝑇𝑇4 > 𝑚𝑚∗ → ∄ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
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Take any vector of all the parameters of the game except 𝑇𝑇. Let 𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷
𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖) represent the value 
of action 𝑎𝑎 ∈ {0,1} for player 𝑖𝑖 when potential damage is 𝐷𝐷 ∈ {0,𝐾𝐾}, under the assumption 
(from LIE1) that all players to his left are choosing the street (𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 = 0 ∀𝑗𝑗 < 𝑖𝑖) and all 
players to his right are choosing Congress (𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 = 1 ∀𝑗𝑗 > 𝑖𝑖). We have then 
𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾



















0(𝑖𝑖) = −𝑐𝑐 
The three first functions are plotted in figure A-1.
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We summarize the analysis in the following proposition, which is the more formal 
equivalent of (heuristic) Proposition 1 in the text. 
 Let 𝑚𝑚∗ be the largest integer such that 
𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
0( ) ≥ 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
1( ).  The identification of the set of parameter vectors for which there is a 
LIE can be visualized by juxtaposing the parameter 𝑇𝑇  with the rest of parameters 
summarized in the functions plotted in Figure A-1.  If 𝑇𝑇 < 𝑚𝑚∗, then the threat of damage 𝐾𝐾 
is credible, the relevant curve for the value of being in Congress is 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
1(𝑖𝑖), and we have a 
LIE in which players 1 through 𝑚𝑚∗ go to the street and players 𝑚𝑚∗ + 1 through 𝑛𝑛 go to 
Congress. If 𝑇𝑇 > 𝑚𝑚∗, then the value of being in the street would be 𝑉𝑉0
0(𝑖𝑖) = −𝑐𝑐, and that 
cannot be an equilibrium, as already stated. For 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑚𝑚∗, the relevant comparison for the 




0(𝑖𝑖), then he 
chooses the street and we have a LIE. If 𝑉𝑉0
1(𝑖𝑖) > 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
0(𝑖𝑖), then he would choose Congress 
and we do not have a LIE. 
 
Appendix Proposition 1: 
Let 𝑚𝑚∗ ≡ max{i| 𝑖𝑖 ∈ ???? 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
0(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
1(𝑖𝑖)} 
(a) A Full Institutionalization Equilibrium in which ℳ∗ = ∅ and ????\ℳ∗ = ???? exists for 
all values of parameters. 
                                                            
52 The functions are written and plotted as continuous for expositional purposes, even though for a given set 
of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖s they are discrete functions.    51   
(b) A Low Institutionalization Equilibrium in which ℳ∗ = {1,2,…𝑚𝑚∗} and ????\ℳ∗ =
{𝑚𝑚∗ + 1,𝑚𝑚∗ + 2,…𝑛𝑛} exists if T<𝑚𝑚∗ or if T=𝑚𝑚∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
0(𝑖𝑖) ≥ 𝑉𝑉0
1(𝑖𝑖). 
We have established conditions for the existence of LIE, in which players up to 𝑚𝑚∗ 
are in the street and players from 𝑚𝑚∗ + 1 are in Congress. In such cases, the equilibrium 
conditions  𝑉𝑉
0(𝑚𝑚∗) ≥ 𝑉𝑉1(𝑚𝑚∗)  and  𝑉𝑉1(𝑚𝑚∗ + 1) ≥ 𝑉𝑉
0(𝑚𝑚∗ + 1)  are satisfied. For 
simplicity, in any case of indifference we assign 𝑚𝑚∗ to the street and 𝑚𝑚∗ + 1 to Congress.  
Under those conditions 𝑚𝑚∗ is unique for any set of parameters for which LIE exists, which 
facilitates the comparative statics. 
 
A.3 Comparative Statics 
 
We can use Figure A-1 to intuitively visualize comparative statics results from the 
parameters of the model to 𝑚𝑚∗.  As asserted in the body of the paper, these comparative 
statics could be interpreted as referring both to the number of people in the street within a 
LIE, and to the possibility of existence of LIE (vis-à-vis FIE that always exists), where 
“possibility” is defined in terms of the size of the set of parameters (other than the one 
being changed) for which the conditions for existence of LIE are satisfied.  First of all, it is 
clear that a larger 𝑇𝑇 makes LIE less likely. For all other parameters, we can see their effect 
by shifting the curves 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
0(𝑖𝑖) and 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
1(𝑖𝑖) in Figure A-1, and by noticing that the larger 𝑚𝑚∗, 
the weaker the requirements on all other parameters for the existence of LIE.  It is easy to 
see that an increase in 𝑐𝑐 shifts 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
0(𝑖𝑖) down, tending to decrease 𝑚𝑚∗, hence decreasing the 
possibility of LIE.  Increasing 𝑋𝑋 has the same effect through an upward shift of 𝑉𝑉𝐾𝐾
1(𝑖𝑖).  
Decreasing 𝐾𝐾 also decreases both 𝑚𝑚∗ and the probability of LIE through leftward shifts in 
both curves.  
Comparative statics on the distribution of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖s can be a bit more involved.  Here we 
prove the effect of increasing the asymmetry of  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖s (or the inequality in the distribution of 
de jure political power) in a particular way.  Let 𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖) = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖  be the cumulative density 
function counting from 𝑛𝑛 to 𝑖𝑖. Notice that 𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖) decreases in 𝑖𝑖. Let 𝑞𝑞 be another distribution, 
with cumulative 𝑄𝑄(𝑖𝑖) = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖 . For brevity and simplicity of exposition we will speak as 
if the functions where continuous, while the proper logic is the discrete equivalent of what 
we say. We will say that 𝑄𝑄(∙) is more unequal than 𝑃𝑃(∙) if 𝑄𝑄(∙) is equally or more elastic   52   
than 𝑃𝑃(∙) for all 𝑖𝑖, and it is strictly more elastic for at least one 𝑖𝑖.  This means that changes 
in 𝑖𝑖 lead to larger changes in the probability under 𝑞𝑞 than under 𝑝𝑝. Notice that this condition 
implies that 𝑃𝑃(∙) first order stochastically dominates 𝑄𝑄(∙). We show that a more unequal 

































As we can see in Figure A-2, this implies that in the case of more unequal distribution of 
power, there will be more (or at least not fewer) people in the street. 
 













𝑚𝑚∗ (approx.)   for 
distribution 𝑝𝑝 
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